Due to the (relatively) small scale of the Norwegian food industry, Private Equity capital is deeply involved in the structural development of the sector through acquisitions and takeovers. The Norwegian socialdemocratic model of agriculture, with its attempts to maintain farming all over the country, struggles with comparative disadvantages in productivity and Private Equity capital is investing in direct competition with farmer cooperatives. An outline of the socio-economic characteristics of the Norwegian model as well as those of Private Equity illuminates why they both fit well together. Thus, we argue in this paper that it is the Norwegian model of agriculture, with its non-market based elements, that today attracts finance capital and discuss whether this involvement of finance capital can be considered a process of financialisation.
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Internal deregulation in the early 1980s liberalised housing markets and the credit systems, of which the latter, since then, had been left to the private banks. The liberalised credit system developed into a credit financed consumption bubble and culminated in a banking crisis in 1992. (Mjøset & Cappelen, 2011) On the other side, adjustments to EU monetary policy making was the main external force behind financial deregulation in the course of the 1990s, in particular EU integration through the EEA. The establishment of the petroleum fund (Norwegian Pension Fund Global), as a connection between the NR-and the C-complex, from 1996, integrated the Norwegian economy into global financial markets through the funds international investment strategy (NBIM 2014) . The Norwegian Private Equity actors were latecomers, in a global context, and became serious players in this market only since the late 1990s decade after the banking crisis (NVCA, 2011) . The market is limited in size and has long been dominated by the venture segment.
The Norwegian state was engaged in early market development, with focus on the venture segment, through state owned investment companies (e.g. Norsk Vekst AS, Argentum AS). But since 2007 in sum most capital is committed to the buyout segment. The Norwegian Private Equity market has a domestic and Nordic character. In 2010 70 per cent of the portfolio companies owned by Norway based funds were headquartered in Norway and 15 per cent in Sweden. In the same year 70 per cent of the portfolio companies were located within technologies (ICT, petroleum, life science, renewable energy). The market therefore has a focus on Scandinavia and on the specific structure of the Norwegian oil and energy economy. But despite this domestic orientation, 60 per cent of new capital committed to Norway based funds in 2010 was foreign capital. There are also many Norwegian companies owned by foreign Private Equity funds.
The NR-complex is dominated by the exploration of oil in the 1970s. Natural resources have always played a major role in the Norwegian economy. Norway is an exporter of timber, fish and This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Klimek, B. & H. . Norwegian Agro-Food Attracting Private Equity Capital; Varieties of Capitalism -Varieties of Financialisation? Sociologia Ruralis, Vol 57, Number 2, April 2017, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12112/epdf. This article may be used for noncommercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving 6 energy, but a net importer of agricultural products (approximately 60 percent of calories consumed). Market-organising institutions follow the logic of comparative advantages and the export possibilities which underlie each natural commodity. As for timber, fish and energy Norway has, due to topographic circumstances, comparative advantages that allow for developing competitive export industries on their basis. The Norwegian model of agriculture, with its attempt to produce volume, does not have these advantages in this far Northern area.
Table 1 about here
Market-organising institutions had been developed before oil came into the game. A system of collective regulations and concessions was first developed in agriculture and the fisheries. When oil was discovered, Norway had already a tradition for regulating the NR-complex for the sake of Norwegian collective interests. (Mjøset and Cappelen, 2011) As for land-based food as part of the NR-complex, a protectionist system of import regulation, target prices and market regulation has been developed. Norwegian agriculture is based on a target price system on selected agricultural products, especially milk and meat. Target prices are average prices that agricultural producers are permitted to obtain in the market. These prices are based on annual negotiations between the state and the two main farmer associations. The aim is to control domestic prices and to safeguard the objectives of national agricultural policies which are income equalisation, localisation of small-scale farming across the entire country, rural settlement and national food security (Almås, 2012) . Negotiated prices, import restrictions and a system of supply-demand regulation are the main 'non-capitalist' pillars for the nationalisation of food.
Institutional complementarities (Crouch, 2010) connect the NR-complex (food) to the L-complex (income policies) and integrate agriculture into the broader frame of the national model of coordinated capitalism.
The Norwegian agri-industrial complex is divided into two parts, an agricultural industry and a processing industry. This is due to the protection of national raw produce. Within the agricultural industry two nation-wide organised farmer cooperatives has come to enjoy the position of a semiThis is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Klimek, B. & H. . Norwegian Agro-Food Attracting Private Equity Capital; Varieties of Capitalism -Varieties of Financialisation? Sociologia Ruralis, Vol 57, Number 2, April 2017, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12112/epdf. This article may be used for noncommercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving 7 authority. The Cooperative Marketing Act (Omsetningsloven) delegated the regulation of supply and demand of milk and meat to the cooperatives. Various administrative procedures have been established to regulate supply and to avoid overproduction. Without them, there would have been pressure on the negotiated prices. Since the enforcement of the Act, the cooperatives have a double function. They are commercial players on the markets and they have an administrative function which is particularly sensitive to market information. The target price system has since the 1990s come under pressure from WTO liberalisation. Target prices are subsidized prices underlying the AMS, which is WTO's yellow box. These WTO-agreements therefore require them to be reduced. In recent years the partners of the agricultural negotiations agreed to exclude poultry and beef from the target price system, and it has been claimed that this was related to the limits set by the WTO (Veggeland 2001 , Olsen 2010 . The complementary institutional integration of agriculture into the Norwegian cooperative model is thus seen as threatened through WTO since the 1990s.
The processing industry operates under the raw material compensation (RÅK) scheme (Borgen and Svennerud and Vengnes, 2001) , which is an attempt to protect the input of Norwegian raw produce under free competition at the industrial level. The so-called non-annex 1 products relate to the EEA agreement, which defines commodities that are subject to the raw materials price compensation. Three instruments can be applied to compensate price differences on raw materials. These are direct tariffs on imported RÅK products, price write-downs on domestically produced materials, and export subsidies that compensate for the price differences between Norwegian and international prices. But limits set by WTO also apply in these cases. The processing industry is fragmented, while the agricultural industry is clustered around the dominating cooperatives.
We find that in the quite small Norwegian food market, Private Equity capital is deeply involved in the restructuration of the industry. This is particularly so at those critical points in the agri-food chain that are the centrepieces of Norway's agricultural model. We locate Food, Private Equity This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Klimek, B. & H. . Norwegian Agro-Food Attracting Private Equity Capital; Varieties of Capitalism -Varieties of Financialisation? Sociologia Ruralis, Vol 57, Number 2, April 2017, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12112/epdf. This article may be used for noncommercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving 8 capital and financialisation in the context of Norwegian capitalism. We identify independent but complementary institutional transformations between the L-, C-, and NR-complexes in the Norwegian economy since the 1990s. WTO sets limits to Norwegian target prices and put pressure on the Norwegian model of agriculture in its complementary integration of the NR-and Lcomplexes. Once a Norwegian market for Private Equity was in place (C-complex), some investors acted to be first movers in a market which was expected to undergo further liberalisation.
We argue that a substantive understanding of the financialisation of Norwegian food has to pay attention to these complementary transformations within Norwegian capitalism. Our analyses in this paper are thus not only directed towards food policies, but to interrelated transformations within the national economy. Institutional complementarities since the 1990s allow us to identify a national variety of food-financialisation in the context of Norwegian capitalism. 
Financialisation and Private Equity

Financialisation
Financialisation is a term that covers a whole research frontier that arose within the broader study of globalisation since the 1980s/1990s. It is an interdisciplinary approach (see e.g. Erturk et al., 2008) consisting of both economic and socio-cultural research. Hence, no broad definition exists in the literature. Financialisation is used to distinguish a new period in capitalist development, marked by a shift from the dominance of productive capital to the dominance of finance capital.
In particular, we rely on the works of Perez (2002) . The focus is on the relationship between productive capital, investing more or less in commodity production, and finance capital, investing in financial assets. Private Equity capital is a specific asset which still consists of both elements (see section 3.2). For this reason we combine social science perceptions of financialisation with business school perceptions of Private Equity buyouts. The linkage between both in this study is the financialisation of the firm, drawn from shareholder value management and agency theory. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Klimek, B. & H. . Norwegian Agro-Food Attracting Private Equity Capital; Varieties of Capitalism -Varieties of Financialisation? Sociologia Ruralis, Vol 57, Number 2, April 2017, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12112/epdf. This article may be used for noncommercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving 9 Greta Krippner focuses on firm behaviour, defining "financialisation as a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production. Financial here refers to activities relating to the provision (or transfer) of liquid capital in expectation of future interest, dividends, or capital gains." (Krippner, 2005:174) More generally, Gerald Epstein argues that "financialisation means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies." (Epstein, 2005:3) Carlota Perez (Perez, 2002 (Perez, , 2009b Mjøset, 2015; Kattel and Drechsler and Reinert, 2009) provides a substantive-qualitative model of the relationship between productive capital and finance capital in capitalist history. Her sequence model of great surges in capitalist development combines Schumpeter's (1942) Perez demonstrates that financialisation is about recurrent hegemonic struggles between financial and productive capital in capitalist history, and actually no new phenomenon of the current era.
The financialisation of the firm signals a shift in corporate governance that has taken place in the 1980s. This started with the expansion of US conglomerates in the 1960s which resulted in too This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Klimek, B. & H. . Norwegian Agro-Food Attracting Private Equity Capital; Varieties of Capitalism -Varieties of Financialisation? Sociologia Ruralis, Vol 57, Number 2, April 2017, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12112/epdf. This article may be used for noncommercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving 10 big and too diversified companies which where underperforming. In the following "a group of American financial economists developed an approach to corporate governance known as agency theory." (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000:15) Agency theorists argue that corporate managers (the agents) operate opportunistically using their control over corporate resources to pursue objectives that were contrary to the interests of the shareholders (the principals). Economists then argued for a realignment of interests between the principals and the agents of the company and the answer has been found in shareholder value-or value based management. Economists like Michael
Jensen then forecasted the eclipse of the public corporation (Jensen, 1989) . Private Equity, and this is the point here, has been presented as one central business model that would respond to these problems (discussion below). Value based management was a way to run the company by emphasizing shareholders' interests in contrast to the alternative stakeholder interests. Corporate financial indicators like free cash flow or stock prices were made the central measures of economic performance. The realignment of interests between principals and agents is thus based on management principles that bring together operative and financial performance. It is here the financialisation of the firm is located. In the next section we will discuss how Private Equity fits well into this frame.
Private Equity buyouts
Private Equity buyouts have been much debated since the 1980s liberalisation of capital flows and the globalisation of economic activity. (Jensen, 1989; Kaplan, 1991; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009 ) In this section we briefly discuss fundraising, typical transactions, and some common features of those companies and markets that primarily are targeted by Private Equity capital.
Since scientific literature on Private Equity activity in the food industry is rare, we have to connect these investment characteristics with the overall characteristics of food industries.
A Private Equity company raises closed-end funds which have a fixed life. Money paid into these funds is provided by the limited partners. Private Equity companies function as general partners who manage the funds transactions over a fixed time period from typically up to 12 years. Within this fixed time frame, the Private Equity company invests in a portfolio of companies. A buyout is a takeover of a company or of single divisions of a company. These portfolio investments have a fixed time frame of typically 3-7 years, too. A Private Equity fund thus consists of a portfolio of temporary fixed investments. When transactions are completed the fund is completed, too.
Earnings are paid to the limited partners who provided the money. The financing of these portfolio buyouts usually consists of 60 per cent to 90 per cent debt and 10 per cent to 40per cent equity which was provided to the fund from the limited partners. Additionally both the general partners as well as the managing staff of the targeted portfolio companies contribute with a small proportion of equity to strengthen incentives to realign agency problems between the operative management and the shareholders. (Kaplan, 1989) The term leverage grounds in the relatively high degree of debt financing and critics of the Private Equity industry most commonly refer to the debt proportion and associated risks. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009:130) see a shift in the Private Equity industry in the early 1990s from financial engineering and corporative governance to a deeper focus on operative performance.
Financial and governance engineering typically relate to three features. The first is a high degree of leverage, financed through debt. The second is the integration of management staff into the financial structure of the transaction through equity stakes. The third is the strategic focus on tax deductibility in the run of the debt applied. Financing buyouts through a high degree of debt pushes the returns on equity given that interest payments are lower than the returns generated through the transaction. Debt therefore leverages the returns on equity. Another important point of financial engineering is high amounts of free cash-flow, because "leveraged buyout candidates are frequently firms or divisions of larger firms that have stable business histories and substantial free cash flow" (Jensen, 1986:325) . Cash available might motivate managing staff to dissipate money. Debt therefore not only leverages the returns, it also helps to realign management and shareholder interests to run the company more effectively. Jensen argues that "debt reduces agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash available for spending at the discretion of managers. These control effects of debt are a potential determinant of capital structure." (Jensen, This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Klimek, B. & H. . Norwegian Agro-Food Attracting Private Equity Capital; Varieties of Capitalism -Varieties of Financialisation? Sociologia Ruralis, Vol 57, Number 2, April 2017, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12112/epdf. This article may be used for noncommercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving 12 1986:324) As for governance, the Private Equity company therefore seeks to integrate management staff into the financial structure (equity stakes) and debt functions as a control mechanism to run the company operatively. Empirical studies of the 1980s buyout wave show that management ownership rose by the factor four when going from public to Private Equity ownership (Kaplan, 1989) .
Critics of the Private Equity industry often mention tax deductibility and negative effects on employment as main reasons. For the present analysis of financialisation we do not deepen the discussion of the social effects of buyouts, but Kaplan and Strömberg (2009:133f.) argue that tax deductibility counted for 10 per cent to 20 per cent of total firm value in the 1980s buyout wave.
They also show that employment rates after Private Equity buyouts in sum are positive, despite harsh social consequences through operational restructuring in each single case. There has also been a discussion about whether Private Equity creates real social values or whether it just skims off value into the hands of a few. The authors claim that through the 1990s, there was a shift in the Private Equity industry towards operational performance and industry focus. Today Private Equity companies often target specific, singular industries, applying expert knowledge as well as capital and networks to the companies acquired.
In sum, these are the characteristics of companies that typically become targets of Private Equity buyouts. Buyouts focus on mature and underperforming companies that operate in markets with favourable industry trends. Industries with stable cash-flows serve to finance the debt in buyouts.
Food industries mostly generate stable cash-flows, since food consumption does not follow economic cycles. (Hansen, 2013:320) Furthermore, food production is not as capital intensive as other industries might be. A lower capital commitment may therefore serve to finance buyout transactions. Barriers to market entry and to substitutes or strong customer relationships are additional general features that make a company or an industry an attractive target for a takeover.
(Porter, 2008) The latter characteristics all apply to the Norwegian food industry on a general level.
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Financialisation in the agri-food chain
As outlined above, financialisation refers to the phenomenon where players within private equity, venture capital, hedge funds, and sovereign wealth funds (such as pension funds) become increasingly involved in the global economy and its governing institutions (See Epstein, 2005) .
Such actors buy into products, industries or businesses mainly aiming for profit making. They typically restructure the company to improve operations, then proceeding to sell the business to an actor who is willing to pay well. The main focus here is on financial results rather than production results (Sippel et al, forthcoming) . In a recent study by Sippel et al (2015, forthcoming) 
financialisation in the Australian agri-food
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Klimek, B. & H. . A major challenge with current financialisation is its system of governance. Given globalisation and a neoliberal agri-food market model, an international system of governance is necessary to protect society against negative social, economic and environmental externalities (Clapp and Fuchs 2009) . It is also necessary that there exist legitimate national systems of governance that are able to negotiate national interests and rights, mediating between the development of global trade and local value creation . Corresponding to the trend of increasing financialisation of the agri-food sector globally also examples of financialisation in both chicken and dairy sector have been found in Norway (Almås, 2013; Klimek, 2015 . This trend is also on the rise throughout Scandinavia, but consumer cultures and political governance models seem to make a difference (see Klimek, 2015) . The restructuring of the Nordic retail markets, with increasing collaboration and growth, are attracting interest of financial players (Almås, 2013) . The next section analyses three cases that exemplify financialisation in the Norwegian agri-food sector. We ask to what extent these Private Equity buyouts are examples of a specific Norwegian variety of agri-food financialisation.
Analysis: Private Equity capital in Norway's agri-food chain
Private Equity buyouts in the Norwegian food industry have so far been considerable, granted that the market is small and also granted that some of the buyouts actually took place in direct competition with the agricultural cooperatives. Cardinal Foods therefore could benefit from both real growth in the market and taking shares from the main competitor. Second, national import restrictions set entry barriers to the Norwegian food market. Together, the two competitors had a market share of about 90 per cent. This also limits the chances that foreign competitors enter the market.
With the entry of a private actor competing with the nation-wide organized farmer cooperative Nortura, the Cardinal Foods buyout also had a political dimension. Two years after the buyout (in 2007), poultry was removed from the specific Norwegian target price system (point 3). The domestic market was liberalized, but import restrictions sustained. Still, our interview data This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Klimek, B. & H. In sum, we argue that complementary transformations since the 1990s attracted Private Equity capital to the Norwegian poultry industry. CapMan could benefit from changing consumption patterns and real market growth. The market structure was spilt between the cooperative and a few competitors who could be targeted for buyouts. WTO liberalisations on the one hand, together with the development of a national market for Private Equity are independent, but complementary, transformations that made poultry an attractive target for Private Equity capital.
Case 2: Scandza, building a Nordic brand house
Scandza is a Nordic brand platform backed by Private Equity capital. The company is based in
Norway but has also subsidiary companies in the Baltic countries. Scandza is a holding company with an investment focus on Nordic brands. Like CapMan, Scandza invested in direct competition with a nation-wide organized farmer cooperative, but this time the giant dairy cooperative Tine. The dairy investment is thus part of a much broader strategy and differs from usual Private Equity buyout characteristics. The investment horizon is not restricted to a seven-year period, and management focus is more on building a brand portfolio than on operative performance in the short term. Representatives of Scandza informed that:
"Scandza is a company that invests in the Nordic food industry. We have specialised on food companies.
We have also stated that we only invest in large scale categories. Dairy is big, beverages are big, snacks are big, cakes are big. Those are the categories where we are" (Representative Scandza) This Private Equity backed investment in the Norwegian food industry contrasts with the other two cases discussed in this paper. Scandza's acquisitions represent a brand portfolio strategy.
Such a strategy requires focusing on synergies between these brands. Table 3 presents the present portfolio of Scandza.
Table 3 about here
According to the Nielsen report 2012 (Nielsen, 2012) beverages, dairy (cheese) and snacks are among the top ten categories in the Norwegian market for fast moving consumer goods. The brand portfolio strategy of Scandza is similar to those of the bigger brand houses like Nestlè, Unilever or the Norwegian company Orkla. Leading brands generate higher returns than raw produce, such as milk, due to added-value mechanisms.
Brand portfolios allow for either extension of a single brand or diversification of different brands under the umbrella of the portfolio.
(Barwise og Robertson 1992) Scandza illustrates a common
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Klimek, B. & H. . Norwegian Agro-Food Attracting Private Equity Capital; Varieties of Capitalism -Varieties of Financialisation? Sociologia Ruralis, Vol 57, Number 2, April 2017, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12112/epdf. This article may be used for noncommercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving 19 trend in global food industries: the acquisition of well-functioning brands. These allow for synergies on the marketing level and take advantage of consumer loyalty, which push bargaining power against the dominating supermarkets ( Burch and Lawrence, 2007) . Similarly with the poultry buyout discussed above, the Scandza case also illustrates investments into direct competition with the farmers' cooperatives. Those parts of the portfolio that are placed in the agricultural industry are perceived as being exclusively Norwegian business cases due to trade restrictions set by the government. The Norwegian dairy investment therefore also indicates a duopolistic growth strategy challenging the cooperative sector. The latter interpretation is supported by a representative of Scandza who said that:
"The investment is a Norwegian investment and we do see opportunities (…) to grow inside a very large market with only one competitor. We need only to be better than Tine." (Leader of the company)
Scandza takes into account the political dimension of milk, which is at the very centrepiece of the Norwegian model of agriculture. Milk is included in the target price system and there is thus no competition on the input of raw milk, only on efficiency at the processing level. This is in contrast to the poultry buyout, where the Private Equity investor had to collaborate with farmers. Entry barriers to foreign competitors are again a main strategic motive behind the investment, given that the domestic market for cheese is split between the two companies (Tine ca. 85 per cent and Synnøve ca. 15 per cent).
In sum, we argue that the Scandza buyout of Synnøve Finden is tightly connected to the restructuring of the Norwegian agricultural model. High Norwegian labour costs in milk production do not play any role since price formation is negotiated on an annual basis. Wellfunctioning brands, entry barriers against foreign competitors and top-ten categories in the market are again central motives for the investments. This buyout also has a political dimension, but of minor importance for this particular case.
Norwegian potato chips depend on potatoes produced in Norway, even though potatoes also are protected by import restrictions. As in the Cardinal Foods buyout discussed above, customs protection of potatoes might have been removed during the transaction period. But Estralla
Maarud's Norwegian snacks production is highly automated, and labour costs therefore did not play any crucial role according to the investor. Entry barriers are given naturally since voluminous packaging makes large scale potato chips production a "local" business due to high transportation costs.
In sum, we argue that this case most clearly illustrates the internationally known trend of Private Equity investments in the agri-food industries. This is a case of revitalizing an underperforming single brand. Snacks are, again, among top-ten categories in the market and there has been a favourable industry trend with sustainable growth rates. Entry barriers are given naturally in this case and were considered strategically by the Herkules management. Import protection does, also for this case, correlate with highly automated production facilities, enabling Estrella Maarud to be competitive even in case of international trade liberalization.
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Klimek, B. & H. Bjørkhaug (2015 The Norwegian capital market (C-complex) was liberalised and integrated globally in the 1990s.
A Norwegian market for Private Equity capital has developed with a specific focus on the domestic market as well as the Scandinavian neighbouring countries. WTO liberalisations since the 1990s have impacted on Norwegian agri-food (as part of the NR-complex) and Norway was since then forced to limit the specific domestic target price system. The target price system secures the farmers income equation (L-complex) and is at the heart of the Norwegian model of agriculture. At the same time, the agri-food systems of the Scandinavian neighbouring countries were integrated into the much bigger single EU market, a process that logically resulted in comparative disadvantages in productivity and economies of scale within the protected Norwegian market. We argue that these transformations explain why the Norwegian agri-food sector since the 1990s is attracting Private Equity capital.
The three empirical cases analysed in this paper enable us to suggest some generalisations on Norwegian labour costs and to meet international competition in the future. Fifth, the maintenance of well-known local brands is a characteristic that make an agri-food company an attractive target of Private Equity capital.
We contribute to the international debate on the financialisation of agriculture and food by pointing out that future research need to specify the context in which financialisation processes take place. Periodisation of finance capital involvement, which in our study is institutional transformations since the 1990s, is an equally important point to contextualise financilisation processes. Literature on the financialisation of agri-food already contains a latent contextualisation between the global south and global north. Further comparative and contextualised research is required to develop a better understanding of the many folded dimensions of finance capital involvement in the agri-food sector across the globe. In our case we define the Norwegian model of capitalism since the 1990s as the context within which the specific Norwegian variety of food-financialisation evolved. We characterise this variety of financialisation in the agri-food chain as "Norwegian" due to the following conditions: At the heart of the Norwegian model of agriculture we identify some basic 'non-capitalist' institutional mechanisms. Annually negotiated target prices and the nation-wide organised cooperatives with market regulating authority are mechanisms that nationalise and de-commodify (Polanyis 1944) food and natural resources. Since the 1990s we have witnessed an ongoing process of commodification of the Norwegian agri-food chain, but some of its components had not yet undergone capitalisation. Hence, Private Equity capital invested in markets with strong 'noncapitalist' elements. Commodification and financialisation, which usually belong to differing This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Klimek, B. & H. . Norwegian Agro-Food Attracting Private Equity Capital; Varieties of Capitalism -Varieties of Financialisation? Sociologia Ruralis, Vol 57, Number 2, April 2017, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/soru.12112/epdf. This article may be used for noncommercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving 24 periods in capitalist history, go hand in hand in this specific Norwegian context. The Norwegian model of capitalism is characterised by institutions facilitating a high degree of cooperation between labour and capital. Private Equity investments in the Norwegian agri-food chain are similar to typical industry investments in efficiency and productivity. Private Equity investors often are well-experienced food industry managers that cooperate with labour unions and follow systems of governance that restrains negative social, economic and environmental externalities.
The Norwegian agri-food market is small in size. Based on these components we argue that these Private Equity buyouts placed in the centre of the Norwegian model of agriculture, demonstrate a process of agri-food financialisation with a Norwegian flavour, one that can be distinguished from the dominating perceptions of financialisation.
Endnotes
1 There were also an attemt by KKR to buy the Norwegain company ORKLA in the early 2000s. This did however fail (see Almås 2013) 2 There has also been a consolidation on the side of the farmer cooperatives in 2006.
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